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[L. .A. No. 22357. In Bank. Oct. 28, 1952.]

RAND EDISON EADS, a Minor, et al., Appellants, v.
HARRY MARKS et al., Defendants; CREAMERIES
OF AMERICA (a Corporation), Respondent.
[la, lb] Pleading-Demurrer to Complaint-Amendment After Demurrer Bustained.-Failure of complaint to allege consideration for defendants' agreement not to leave dairy products or
glass containers therefor at plaintiffs' residence except in a
refrigerator in the house is a deficiency which might be corrected by amendment, and it is an abuse of discretion to
sustain a demun;er to the complaint without leave to amend.
[2] Actions-Contract or Tort.-The same act may be both a tort
and a breach of contract.
~ [3] !d.-Contract or Tort.-Even where there is a contractual
relationship between the parties,. a .cause of action in tort may
sometimes arise out of the negligent manner in which the
contractual duty is performed, or out of failure to perform
such duty. ·
' [4] !d.-Contract or Tort.-Where a duty of care arose by reason
of contract and plaintiff has sued in tort for breach of that
duty, the cqntract is of significance only in creating the legal
duty, and defendant's negligence should not be considered as a
breach of contract, but as a tort governed by tort rules.
[6] !d.-Contract or Tort.-An action arising from a breach' of
promise is ex contractu, but if it arises from a breach of duty
growing out of the contract it is ex delicto.
[6] !d.-Contract or Tort.-An action arising from breach of a
contractual duty is ex delictual notwithstanding that it also
involves a breach of contract.
[7] Id.-Contra.ct or Tort.-.A tort may grow out of or be coincident with a contract, and the existence of a contractual
relation does not immunize a tort feasor from tort liability
for his wrongful acts in breach of the contract.
[8] !d.-Contract or Tort.-Contractual negligence ordinarily gives
rise to an action either on contract or in tort, and the injured
party may at his election waive the contract and sue in tort, or
waive the tort and base his action on the contract alone.
[9] !d.-Contract or Tort.-Actions based on negligent failure to
perform contractual duties, although containing elements of
[8) See Cal.Jur.2d, Actions, §§ 29, 30; Am.Jur., Actions, §55.
McK. Dig. References: [1) Pleading, § 103(2); [2-9] Actions,
§15; [10) Negligence, §108; [ll] Negligence, §16]; [12] Negligence, § ll2.
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both contract and tort, are generally regarded as delictual
actions, since negligence is considered the gravamen of the
action.
[lOa., lOb] Negligence- Pleading- Proximate Oa.use.-Complaint
alleging that defendants agreed not to leave dairy products or
glass containers therefor at plaintiffs' residence except in n
refrigerator in the house, that defendants negligently left a
glass container on the back porch of such residence, and thnt
plaintiff minor child picked up such container and fell off the
porch, suffering severe and permanent injuries, sufficiently
alleges that defendants' negligence was the proximate cause
of the child's injuries, since the child's independent intervening
action was readily foreseeable and should have been anticipated.
.
/ [11] !d.-Proximate Cause-Intervening Oa.uses.-Where an intervening act is reasonably foreseeable, the chain of causation is
not broken, and the original actor re~ains liable.
[12] Id.-Plea.ding-Amendment.-In action for injuries sufferPd
by minor child because of breach of duty gro~g out of defendants' agreement not to leave dairy products or containers
therefor at plaintiffs' residence except in a refrigerator in the
house, where the uncertainties in the complaint might be ·
obviated by amendment, it was an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer to ~he complaint without leave to amend.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Oourt of Los
Angeles Oounty. William B. McKesson, Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for
defendants reversed.
Robert H. Green for Appellants.
Jennings & Belcher and George M. Henzie for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Plaintiffs, Rand Edison Eads, a 2-year-old
minor child, through his father and guardian ad litem, Harold
Madison Eads, and Harold Madison Eads, sued defendant
Creameries of America (sued as Doe One) for damages for
personal . injuries allegedly suffered by said minor child because of the negligence of defendant, its agents, servants and
employees.
Defendant's (Creameries of America) general and special·
demurrer to plaintiffs' first amended complaint was sustained
[11] See Oa.l.Jur., Negligence, § 17; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 67.
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without leave to amend and judgment thereon was entered in
favor of defendant.
In plaintiffs' amended complaint it was alleged (in part):
"That at all times from on or about December 20, 1947, continuously to August 12, 1949, the plaintiffs, Harold Madison
Eads, and (sic) been and was a customer of defendants, and
at all times there had been a delivery service maintained and
conducted by defendants wherein defendants had supplied
and delivered to plaintiffs at plaintiffs' said place of residence, milk, cream, butter, eggs and other dairy products
for a valuable consideration and a:t the prices established by
defendants therefor.
''That on or about December 1, 1948, at which time the
said plaintiff, Rand Edison Eads, was of the approximate
·age of one year, the defendants and each of them were infanned by the plaintiff, Harold Madison Eads, and by Lenore
Eads, the wife of said plaintiff, that no dairy products, glass
containers, milk or milk bottles were to bt~left at the said residence of plaintiffs except in the refrigerator in the house,
and that all empty milk bottles and glass containers for the
defendants would be left within the house. That at said time
plaintiff, Harold Madison Eads, and his said wife informed
the defendants that if said dairy products or the containers
therefor were left within the reach of the minor child that
said minor child might be injured by picking up, -dropping
or tripping over such dairy products andjor the glass containers therefore (sic) , and further informed the defendants
and each of them that in the absence of plaintiffs, empty
glass containers would be placed upon the back porch of said
residence with a memorandum or note stating that no milk or
dairy products were to be left; and the defendants and each
of them (agreed to said req1test and) informed the plaintiff,
Harold Madison Eads, and his said wife that none of said
products or glass containers therefor would be left except
within said refrigerator, and that empty glass containers
would be removed by defendants from the back porch, and
not left at said residence upon the reglllar delivery times;
that on or about August 12, 1949, defendants and each of
them negligently, carelessly and wrongfully placed, deposited,
left, and permitted to remain a glass milk container upon the
back porch of said residence, and the said minor plaintiff,
picked up said container and fell off the [said] porch, causing
the container to break within close proximity to his face; that
as a direct and proximate result of the negligent and wrongful
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acts of the defendants the said Rand Edison Eads was caused
to suffer severe and permanent injuries, pain and suffering,
all to his damage in the sum of $25,000.00. ''
Defendant demurred on the ground that the complaint did
not contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and
that it was uncertain in that it did not contain facts showing
wherein any duty was owed to the minor plaintiff, in what
manner any act or omission of defendant was a proximate
cause of plaintiffs' injury, what consideration may have existed to support any agreement with any plaintiff for the removal of empty bottles, whether defendants are charged· with
placing or depositing the milk bottle on the porch or permitting one to remain there, whether the milk container involved
was full (as delivered by defendant) or empty (as having
been in the possession of plaintiffs), whether defendant is
charged with permitting the milk bottle to remain on the
porch and whether the time was a "milk delivery time."
The italicized portions of the complaint constitute the
amendments made by plaintiffs. Although there is nothing
in the record to substantiate the statement, plaintiffs contend
that the amendments were made at the direction of the trial
court upon the hearing and argument on the original
complaint.
Plaintiffs have alleged an agreement made with defendant
and, implicit therein, is the allegation that it was made expressly for the benefit of their minor child, the third party
beneficiary thereof. (Walsh v. Walsh, 42 Cal.App.2d 282,
285 [108 P.2d 760]; LeBallister v. Redwood Theatres, Inc.,
1 Cal.App.2d 447 [36 P.2d 827] .) [la] It is true that no
consideration for 'the contract was alleged, but that was a
deficiency which plaintiffs might have been able to supply by
amendment. The consideration for such agreement may well
have been the plaintiffs' promise to continue to buy dairy
products from defendant rather than from another firm. ·
Assuming that there was a valid agreement for the benefit
of plaintiffs' minor child, defendant next contends that plaintiffs have no cause of action in tort for the failure to perform. [2] The same act may be both a tort and a breach of
contract. (L. B. Labomtories, Inc. v. Mitchell, ant!3, pp. 56,
62-63 [244 P.2d 385] .) [3] Even where there is a contractual relationship between the parties, a cause of action in tort
may sometimes arise out of the liegligent ;manner in which
the contractual duty is performed, or out of a failure to perform such duty. (Green v. Hanson, 103 Cal.App. 430 [284
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P. 1082]; Jones v. Kelly, 208 Cal. 251 [280 P. 942] ; Wetzel
v. Pius, 78 Cal.App. 104 [248 P. 288].) [4] Here, the duty of
care arose by reason of the contract, and plaintiff has sued
in tort for the breach of that duty. The contract is of significance only in creating the legal duty, and the negligence
of the defendant should not be considered as a breach of contract, but as a tort governed by tort rules. (Rushing v. Pickwick Stages Systern, 113 Cal.App. 240 [298 P. 150]; Basler
v. Sacramento etc. Ry. Co., 166 Cal. 33 [134 P. 993] .)
[5] As was said in Peterson v. Sherman, 68 Cal.App.2d
706, 711 [157 P .2d 863] : "It has been well established in
this state that if the cause of action arises from a breach
of a promise set forth in the contract, the action is ex contractu but if it arises from a breach of duty growing out of
the contract it is ex delicto . . . . " (See, also, Jones v. Kelly,
supra, 208 Cal. 251, 254-255.) [6] Where the cause of action arises from the breach of a contractual duty, the action
is delictual notwithstanding that it also involves a breach of
contract. (Jones v. Kelly, supra; Peterson v. Sherman,
s1tpra.) Defendants maintain that there can be no action in
tort because there is no general duty of care arising out of
the vendor-vendee relationship. In situations such as this,
there is contractual ·negligence or the breach of a primary
duty owed to the injured party, the duty arising ' out of
the contract. [7] A tort may grow out of or be coincident
with a contract, and the existence of a contractual relationship does not immunize a tort feasor from tort liability for
his wrongful acts in breach of the contract (Jones v. Kelly,
supra, 208 Cal. 251' . [8] Contractual negligence ordinarily
gives rise to an action either on contract or in tort, and the
injured party may at his election waive the contract and sue
in tort (Loup v. Califo·rnia Southern R. R. Co., 63 Cal. 97, 99;
Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124 [217 P.2d 113,
17 A.L.R.2d 929]); or waive the tort and base his a,ction on
the contract alone (Single.y v. Bigelow, 108 Cal.App. 436, 444
[291 P. 899]; L . B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell, supra, ante,
p. 56; 1 Cal.Jur.2d, Actions, § 29). [9] In general, however, it
has been held that actions based on negligent failure to perform contractual duties, such as those owing from a hospital
(Harding v. Liberty Hospital Corp., 177 Cal. 520 [171 P. 98])
or physician (Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316 [55 P. 1000])
to a patient, from an employer to an employee (Krebenios v.
Lindauer, 17 5 Cal. 431 [166 P. 17] ) , fro in a landlord to a
tenant (Jones v. Kelly, supra) although containmg elements
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of both contract and tort, are regarded as delictual actions,
since negligence is considered the gravamen of the action.
[lOa.] Defendant contends that the complaint is insufficient
in that there is nothing to show what act or omission attributable to it was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained
by the minor plaintiff. Plaintiffs allege that defendants ''and
each of them. negligently, carelessly and wrongfully placed,
deposited, left, and permitted to remain a glass milk container upon the back porch of said residence, and the said
minor plaintiff, picked up said container and fell off the porch
causing the container to break within close proximity to his
face; that as a direct and proximate result of the negligent
and wrongful acts of the defen:zts the said Rand Edison
Eads was· caused to suffer'' etc Although the injury resulted from the independent int rvening action of the child,
such occurrence was readily foreseeable and should have been
anticipated. [11] Where the intervening act is reasonably
foreseeable, the chain of causation is not broken, and the m,oiginai actor remains liableLf (Mas..~l}y_ v. .Arden li!arms Oo., 26
Cal.2d 213 [157 P .2d 37f, 158 A.L.R. 872] ; Osborn v. City of
Whittier, 103 Cal.App.2d 609 [230 ·p .2d 132].) Here, the
precise injury occurred which plaintiffs, by their agreement,
sought to prevent.
[lOb] Taking the allegations o£ the complaint as true, as we
are bound to do (Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29
Cal.2d 34, 41 [172 P.2d 867]), it is our opinion that the
agreement between plaintiffs and defendant created a duty
of care on the part of defendant toward plaintiffs' minor child,
that plaintiffs properly sued in tort for the breach of that duty,
and that there was a sufficient allegation that defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the · child's injuries.
[lb, 12] The other points raised by defendant in its demurr~r
might have been obviated by amendment, and we are therefore of the opinion that the trial court abused its discretion
in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.. .As this
court said in We'll.nerholrn v. Stanford University School of
Medicine, 20 Cal.2d ·713, 718, 719 [128 P.2d ;522, 141 A.L.R.
1358] : "Where a complaint is sufficient against a general
demurrer, however, .and any uncertainties or ambiguities in
the pleading can be corrected by amendment, it is apparent
that denial of leave to amend results in a disposition of the
cause upon technical grounds alone. The plaintiff who has
stated a cause of action in such a case is denied a trial on the
merits of his action if any of the grounds of special demurr.e r
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is well taken, despite the fact that the deficiencies can be
corrected. It has been held, under such circumstances, that
denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion
even though it be conceded that the trial court had authority
to sustain the special demurrer because of defects in the form
of pleading (Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital, 18 Cal.2d 97,
104 [114 P.2d 1] ; Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 579 [122
P.2d 564, 140 A.L.R. 1328], and cases cited therein) . . . . "
Wilk erson v. Seib, 20 Cal.2d 556 127 P.2d 904] ; Photockart
v. Del R1:cdo, 94 Cal.App.2d 315 [210 P.2d 547]; Davis v.
Wood, 61 Cal.App.~d 788 [143 P.2d 740].
We therefore hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.
We do not decide, however, that the complaint was not subject
to special demurrer, and the trial court may in its discretion
require the clarification of uncertainties or ambiguities in the
complaint.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J ., Traynor, J., Schauer,
,J., and Spence, J., C<?ncurred.

[L . .A.. No. 21968. In Bank. Oct. 31, 1952.]

SERVE YOURSELF GASOLINE STATIONS ASSOCIATION, INC. (a Corporation) et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. A. A. BROCK, as Director of the Department
of Agriculture et al., Respondents; URICH'S SERVE
YOURSELF STATIONS, INCORPORATED (a Corporation) et al., Interveners and Appellants.
[1] Constitutional Law-Police Power-Legislative Discretion and
Court Review.-In reviewing legislation for the purpose of
testing its propriety as an exercise of the police power, the
power of the court is limited to determining whether the subject of the legislation is within the state's power, and if so
[1] See Oal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 116; Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 305.
McK. Dig, References: [1] Constitutional Law, § 107; [2] Constitutional Law, §56; [3, 6, 7, 9-11, 15, 16] Garage Keepers, § 1a;
[4] .Advertisements, § 5; [5] Constitutional Law, § 98; [8] Constitutional Law, § 61; [12] Constitutional Law, § 144; [13] Constitutional Law, § 140; [14] Constitutional Law, § 156.

